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D ROHIBITIONS against usury' have ancient roots.2 The Old Testa-
ment contains several passages that strongly condemn usurious lending
practices.3 In medieval times, the Church denounced usury as a sin.4
Early Texas law similarly prohibited usury.'
The Texas Constitution empowers the legislature to define interest6
and to fix maximum rates of interest.7 Absent such legislation fixing a
greater rate,8 the constitution sets a maximum interest rate of ten per-
cent 9 per annum.' 0 Contracts for a greater rate of interest are deemed
* B.A., J.D., University of Texas at Austin. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. In its earliest stages, usury was defined as whatever was demanded in return for a
loan beyond the loaned good itself. J. NOONAN, THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY 20
(1957). That definition has evolved, so that usury in Texas is now defined as "interest in
excess of the amount allowed by law." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(d)
(Vernon 1971).
2. See generally S. HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 17-65 (1963); B. NELSON,
THE IDEA OF USURY (1949); J. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 11-20; T. WILSON, A DISCOURSE
UPON USURY (1963).
3. "Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother; usury of money, usury of victuals,
usury of any thing that is lent upon usury. Deuteronomy 23:19. See also Psalms 15:5,
Leviticus 25:36-37.
4. J. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 11-20.
5. The Fourth Congress of the Republic of Texas set the maximum interest rate at 12%
per annum, and provided that all contracts that stipulated a greater rate were void. I J.
SAYLES & H. SAYLES, EARLY LAWS OF TEXAS 337-38 (1888). The constitution of 1869 elim-
inated all usury laws in Texas and prohibited the legislature from passing laws to limit the
amount of interest. TEX. CONST. art. XII, § 44 (1869). In 1876, however, protective meas-
ures were reintroduced at the same maximum 12% rate. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11 (1876,
amended 189 1). The 1876 constitution further provided that all interest charged above the
maximum rate was usurious and empowered the legislature to "provide appropriate pains
and penalties to prevent and punish [usury]." Id This limit was lowered to 10% per annum
in 1891. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11 (1876, amended 1891).
6. The legislature has done so in art. 5069-1.01(a) of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes.
Interest is defined there as "the compensation allowed by law for the use or forbearance or
detention of money." TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(a) (Vernon 1971).
7. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11.
8. One example of legislation fixing a greater than 10% per annum rate is S.B. 10,
passed by the 66th Legislature in June 1979. That bill authorized a maximum annual inter-
est rate of 18% on all nonagricultural and nonresidential loans of $250,000 or more that are
evidenced by a written contract. See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 305, § 1, at 704-05
(Vernon) (amending TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(b)).
9. "Percent," the common abbreviation of the Latin "per centum," will be used
throughout this Article. Unless otherwise indicated, all percentages are annual rates.
10. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11. See also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02
(Vernon 1971) (maximum interest rate set at 10%, except as otherwise fixed by law). Re-
gardless of the state usury ceiling, however, national banks may charge a rate of interest
equal to one percent in excess of the federal reserve discount rate. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976). As
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usurious. '
Prior to August 27, 1979, lenders in Texas were limited by a ten percent
per annum interest ceiling on loans to noncorporate borrowers who de-
sired to finance the purchase of a residence.' 2 As prevailing interest rates
in national money markets began to increase in 1978 and 1979, this ten
percent interest ceiling decreased the availability of mortgage money to
purchasers of homes in Texas.' 3 Because lenders had to pay more for the
money they were loaning than they could earn under the ten percent
limit, 4 lenders either attempted to circumvent the usury law by charging
points" to the seller," or stopped making residential mortgage loans in
Texas altogether, 17 resulting in an untenable situation. To remove this se-
rious obstacle to home ownership, the Sixty-sixth Texas Legislature en-
acted House Bill 409 (H.B. 409) to allow higher interest rates on residential
of Sept. 7, 1979, national banks could charge an individual borrower an interest rate equal to
11-1/2%.
11. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 1I. The Texas Legislature has also prescribed usury penal-
ties. Prior to 1979, lenders who contracted for, charged, or received usurious interest were
required to forfeit twice the amount of total interest contracted for, plus reasonable attor-
neys' fees, to the borrower. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 274, § 2, at 610. The 66th Legislature
changed the forfeiture amount to three times the "amount of usurious interest contracted
for," plus reasonable attorneys' fees. 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 281, § l, at 604 (Vernon)
(emphasis added). It defined "amount of usurious interest contracted for" as "the amount
the total interest contracted for, charged, or received exceeds the amount of interest allowed
by law." Id The legislature added the requirement that the amount forfeited shall equal at
least $2,000 or 20% of the principal, whichever is smaller. Id at 604-05.
12. See note 10 supra. Corporate borrowers are not subject to the 10% ceiling.
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, corporations ... may agree to and stipulate
for any rate of interest as such corporation may determine, not to exceed one and one-half
percent (1-1/2%) per month." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp.
1978-1979). Noncorporate borrowers, for purposes of state usury laws, include individuals,
trusts, partnerships, limited partnerships, joint ventures, unincorporated associations, and
possibly nonprofit corporations. See generally Loiseaux, Some Usury Problems in Commer-
cial Lending, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 419, 438-41 (1971).
13. See TEXAS BUSINESS, May 1979, at 37. See generally McNulty, The Impact of Usury
Ceilings on Home Financing, 8 REAL EST. REV., Summer 1978, at 68.
14. As the cost of money to lenders increased, the permitted Texas rate suddenly be-
came less than the interest rates lenders had to pay for the money they were lending. See
Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1979, at 30, col. 1.
15. The word "point" as used in the home mortgage finance industry "simply denotes a
fee or charge equal to one per cent (1%) of the principal amount of the loan which is col-
lected by the lender at the time the loan is made." B.F. Saul Co. v. West End Park N., Inc.,
246 A.2d 591, 595 (Md. 1978). See Loiseaux, supra note 12, at 422 (author found no Texas
case that uses the term "points").
16. The practice of charging points was itself constrained by Texas usury laws. In Gon-
zales County Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. 1976), the Texas
Supreme Court ruled that a front-end "premium" charged to borrowers by a lender "will be
deemed to constitute interest when seekin$ to determine the existence or nonexistence of
usury" (footnote omitted). Inclusion of points as interest to determine usury further aggra-
vated the shortage of home mortgage money in Texas. Contrast the charging of "points"
with the collection of bona fide commitment fees, which are not treated as interest. Id.
17. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corporation announced it would not make any more
single family mortgage loans in Texas until the usury laws were changed. Wall St. J., Apr.
30, 1979, at 2, col. 2. See Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1979, at 30, cols. 1-3. Other lenders sharply
curtailed their residential lending. Texas Federal Savings and Loan Association's mortgage
volume fell by one-half to two-thirds during 1978. Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1979, at 30, col. 1.
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loans."8 Unfortunately, H.B. 409 may have created more problems than it
solved.
Fundamentally, H.B. 409 increases the ceiling on interest rates on loans
secured in whole or in part by a lien on certain residential real property to
such rates as may be permitted by other applicable law, or to the lesser of
twelve percent per annum or a rate (the "floating rate") that is two percent
per annum in excess of the average per annum market yield (the "note
rate") on ten-year United States Treasury notes and bonds.' 9 The floating
rate is to be determined by reference to the note rate for the second calen-
dar month preceding the month in which the lender becomes legally
bound to make the loan.2" House Bill 409 restricts its coverage to loans
secured in whole or part by a lien on real property "on which is located
one or more single family dwellings, or dwelling units for not more than
four families in the aggregate . . . ." House Bill 409 also prohibits pre-
payment charges unless required by an agency created by federal law2"
and incorporates antidiscriminatory and antiredlining provisions for cer-
tain lenders.22
This Article discusses the scope of H.B. 409 and highlights the more
troublesome aspects of the statute. The discussion relies on general rules
of statutory construction under Texas law, 23 relevant case authority, and a
good deal of guess-work.
18. 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 715, at 1766-68 (Vernon). The bill is set out fully in
the Appendix.
19. Id § I (to be codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(d)(1)).
20. Id § 1 (to be codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(d)(2)). For
example, if a loan agreement becomes binding on March 5, the floating rate is determined
by reference to the United States Treasury note rate for the preceding January. See note 30
infra.
21. Id § 1 (to be codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(d)(4)); see text
accompanying notes 55-73 infra.
22. Id § 4 (to be codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(e)); see text
accompanying notes 83-93; 104-29 infra.
23. The Texas Legislature has established guidelines for statutory construction for
Texas courts. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 10 (Vernon 1969) provides the frequently
applied plain meaning rule. The plain meaning rule is utilized to resolve questions of con-
struction when words used in a statute are subject to differing interpretations. Nevertheless,
courts are proscribed from adopting an interpretation of a statute that gives literal meaning
to certain words or clauses if such an interpretation would defeat the legislative intent or
would lead to an absurdity, injustice, or uncertainty, and if such an interpretation reason-
ably can be avoided. Rogers v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., 214 S.W.2d 160, 167 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1948), a1f'd, 147 Tex. 617, 218 S.W.2d 456 (1949).
Although every word in a statute is presumed to be used for a purpose, Perkins v. State,
367 S.W.2d 140, 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963), courts may supply, omit, and transpose words
or phrases in a statute in order to arrive at legislative intent. See Patterson v. City of Dallas,
355 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.), appeal dismissed, 372 U.S.
251 (1963). Notwithstanding the foregoing, courts are without authority to do more than
declare and enforce the law and may not assume the legislative role of remedying statutory
defects. Hilliard v. Wilkerson, 492 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ
granted). The fundamental rule in statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to
the intent of the legislature, Jessen Assocs., Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593, 599 (Tex. 1975),
and courts may liberally construe legislative enactments in order to give effect to legislative
intent. City of San Marcos v. Lower Colo. River Auth., 508 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1974), modfledin other respects, 523 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1975) (court held that
19791
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I. SCOPE OF H.B. 409
Section 1 of H.B. 409 increases the maximum interest rate allowable on
loans that are secured or to be secured by an interest in real property "on
which is located one or more single family dwellings.",24 An interpretation
of the phrase, "on which is located," is necessary to ascertain the scope of
this statute. Application of the "plain meaning" rule of statutory construc-
tion25 to H.B. 409 suggests that the statute is limited to loans secured or to
be secured by an interest in real property on which one or more single-
family residences are already located. This interpretation would exclude
loans for construction of new homes. There is no evidence of legislative
intent contrary to this interpretation.
This apparent failure to include construction loans within the scope of
the statute creates a gap in the Texas usury laws, resulting in a continuing
ceiling of ten percent per annum for construction loans of less than
$250,000 made to noncorporate borrowers. This anomaly is the product of
insufficient coordination among the three separate usury bills adopted in
the Sixty-sixth Legislature. Senate Bill 1026 (S.B. 10) supplants section (b)
of article 5069-1.07.27 Under the amended section, a noncorporate bor-
home-rule city had power to regulate electricity rates by ordinance for electricity sold within
city limits).
While these general principles of statutory construction do not provide a conclusive guide
as to the meaning of H.B. 409, and no Texas statute provides problems of construction
analogous to those of H.B. 409, the plain meaning rule of statutory construction coupled
with the legislature's obvious intent to raise interest rates on home mortgage loans and dis-
courage discriminatory lending practices in Texas must be looked to for guidance as to how
Texas courts will construe H.B. 409.
24. That section provides in part:
(d)(1) On any loan or agreement to loan secured or to be secured in whole or
in part by a lien, mortgage, security interest, or other interest in or with respect
to real property on which is located one or more single family dwellings, or
dwelling units for not more than four families in the aggregate, interest may
be charged at such rates as may be permitted by other applicable law or at the
lesser of the following rates:
(i) 12 percent per annum; or
(ii) a rate equivalent to the average per annum market yield rate ad-
justed to constant maturities on 10-year United States Treasury notes and
bonds as published by the board of governors of the Federal Reserve
System for the second calendar month preceding the month in which the
lender becomes legally bound to make the loan plus an additional two
percent per annum rounded off to the nearest quarter of one percent per
annum.
1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 715, § I, at 1766 (Vernon).
25. See note 23 supra.
26. See note 8 supra.
27. Senate Bill 10 amended art. 5069-1.07(b) to read as follows:
(b) Notwithstanding any contrary provisions of law, any person may agree
to pay, and may pay pursuant to such an agreement, any rate of interest not
exceeding 18 percent per annum, if such agreement is evidenced by a written
bond, note, or other contract of such person providing for a loan or other
extension of credit in the original principal amount of $250,000 or more, or
any series of advances of money if the aggregate of all sums advanced or
agreed or contemplated to be advanced pursuant to such agreement equals or
exceeds $250,000, or any extension or renewal of such loan or other extension
of credit (regardless of whether or not the outstanding principal balance
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rower seeking a construction loan for a one- to four-family dwelling unit is
limited to the old ten percent per annum ceiling, thereby decreasing the
likelihood of obtaining financing in today's money market, unless the loan
equaled or exceeded $250,000 and the borrower did not intend to reside in
the dwelling. Thus, neither H.B. 409 nor S.B. 10 provide interest rate relief
to small scale home builders or to the potential homeowner who desires to
finance construction of a home on a lot he already owns.
As H.B. 409 does not apply to construction loans, to what loans does it
apply? The statute specifies "any loan or agreement to loan" that may be
secured to some extent by a lien or other interest in real property on which
are located one or more single-family dwellings. 28 Nothing in the statute
requires that the borrower either own the real property or reside in the
dwelling located thereon. Moreover, there is no limitation on the amount
of property that can be covered by a mortgage or other lien under H.B. 409
so long as a qualifying dwelling unit is located somewhere on the real
property.
II. AVAILABILITY OF HIGHER INTEREST RATES UNDER H.B. 409:
MECHANICS OF THE STATUTE
A. When is a Lender "Legally Bound to Make a Loan"?
Section (d)(l) of amended article 5069-1.07 allows interest to be
charged at the lesser of twelve percent or the floating rate pegged to the
market yield on specified federal obligations.2 9 Ascertaining the floating
rate requires a determination of the average market yield3" for ten-year
thereof at the time of such renewal or extension is $250,000 or more); and as to
any such agreement to pay or payment, the claim or defense of usury by such
person or such person's heirs, personal representatives, successors, substitutes,
or anyone else on such person's behalf, or by any person acting as guarantor,
surety, accommodation maker, or endorser for or with respect to such agree-
ment to pay or payment, or by any person assuming the obligation of such
payment or otherwise becoming liable therefor, or by any person owning or
acquiring property subject to a lien securing such agreement to pay or such
payment is prohibited. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
herein, this Subsection (b) shall not apply to any loan or other extension of
credit secured by (i) a lien on a building, constructed or to be constructed,
which both is used or intended to be used as a single one-to-four family resi-
dence and is occupied or intended to be occupied by a person obligated to pay
such loan or other extension of credit or (ii) a hen on land intended to be used
primarily for agricultural or ranching purposes. Nothing herein shall be con-
strued to limit or otherwise affect the provisions or application of Article 2.09,
Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act, as amended (Article 1302-1.01
et seq., Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), with respect to loans or other exten-
sions of credit not covered hereby.
1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 305, § 1, at 704-05 (Vernon).
28. See note 24 supra.
29. Id
30. These yields on actively traded issues adjusted to constant maturities are published
in a Federal Reserve Statistical Release (Form G. 13 [415]). According to that release, the
source for the yields is the U.S. Treasury. For example, a lender who became legally bound
to make a loan on Sept. 7, 1979, could charge 11% per annum because the market yield for
July, the second calendar month preceding commitment, was 8.95%. This is determined by
1979]
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United States Treasury notes and bonds3' existing two months preceding
the month in which the lender becomes "legally bound to make the
loan.",32 Although the meaning of this term is essential to determine the
floating rate, H.B. 409 does not define when a lender is "legally bound to
make the loan."
The plain meaning rule provides that unless a phrase in a statute is a
term of art used in a particular trade or subject matter, such a phrase shall
take on its ordinary meaning.33 The phrase "legally bound" does not ap-
pear to be a term of art in the real estate area. The term "to bind" has
been defined to mean "to obligate; to bring or place under definite duties
or legal obligations, particularly by a bond or covenant; to affect one in a
constraining or compulsory manner with a contract or a judgment. 34
Thus, the initial inquiry into a determination of when a lender is legally
bound to make a loan should focus on when a legal obligation has been
created between the lender and the borrower.
Requirement of a Contract. Whether a lender is legally bound to make a
loan will often depend on the type of commitment, if any, issued by the
lender and the nature of its terms. A written commitment from the lender
to the borrower may become an enforceable contract upon the borrower's
acceptance if the terms of the contract define with sufficient certainty the
nature and the extent of each party's obligations. No binding contract ex-
ists if essential terms are left open for future negotiations between the par-
ties.35 Similarly, if there is no evidence of mutual assent or a meeting of
adding 2% to the average market yield rate, rounded off to the nearest quarter of 1%, for the
month of July. (8.95%, rounded to 9.0%) plus 2.0% equals 11.0%.
31. Treasury notes are obligations of the U.S. Government with intermediate maturi-
ties, typically not less than one year nor more than five years. Notes are largely bearer
issues, although certain issues may be issued in registered form. F. GARCIA, MUNN s ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 743 (6th ed. 1962). Bonds, in contrast, are typically
issued with maturities of over five years. Id at 755. A number of states have chosen a
similar floating rate, in which the ceiling is tied to some market rate of interest. Nine states
had floating rates in mid-1977. McNulty, supra note 13, at 72.
32. See note 24 supra.
33. TEX. REV. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 10, § 1 (Vernon 1969). See note 23 supra.
34. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 213 (rev. 4th ed. 1968); see Stone v. Bradbury, 14 Me.
185, 193 (1837).
35. In Willowood Condominium Ass'n v. HNC Realty Co., 531 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir.
1976), the Fifth Circuit held that two letters describing loan terms to a developer from a
commercial lender contained sufficient ambiguities and lacked essential terms so as to pre-
clude the formation of a contract. The two letters had set forth the terms upon which the
loan would be made and stated that the loan committee had acted favorably upon the loan.
In holding that a contractual obligation did not arise, the Fifth Circuit restated the Texas
law as follows:
It is hornbook law as well as clearly the law of Texas that "'[a] court cannot
enforce a contract unless it can determine what it is. It is not enough that the
parties think that they have made a contract; they must have expressed their
intentions in a manner that is capable of understanding.' . . ." "It is said to
be fundamental that a person may not be subjected by law to a contractual
obligation unless the character of such obligation is fixed with a reasonable
degree of definiteness by an express or implied agreement of the parties
Id at 1251 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 33
HOUSE BILL 409
the minds, no contract is formed.36
A loan commitment can be an enforceable contract if the traditional
elements of a contract are present. Nevertheless, the loan commitment
may, and usually does, contain conditions that suggest that a lender is not
legally bound to fund the loan. These conditions may be interpreted either
as conditions precedent to the formation of a contract or as conditions pre-
cedent to an obligation to perform an existing agreement.37 Terms such as
"if," "provided that," "on condition that," or other phrases that condition
performance generally denote an intent for a condition and not a covenant
or promise.38 If the loan commitment is otherwise a valid contract, the
existence of a condition precedent to a right to immediate performance or
to a successful suit for breach of a contractual duty does not render the
issuer any less bound to make the loan.39 The borrower's ability to enforce
the lender's performance or to sue for a breach of contractual duty does
not arise, however, until the conditions precedent to the right to immediate
performance are satisfied.4"
There is some question whether a commitment containing conditions
requiring the personal satisfaction of the lender constitutes a legally bind-
ing contract or instead presents an illusory contract upon which the lender
would never be legally bound. A limitation on a promisor's duty, how-
ever, does not invalidate the contract as long as that limitation does not
make his own promise illusory.4' Under Texas law an expression of per-
sonal dissatisfaction by one of the parties to a contract must be made in
subjective good faith42 or must be objectively reasonable.43 If, however,
36. Id
37. Hohenberg Bros. v. George E. Gibbons & Co., 537 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. 1976). The
Texas Supreme Court aptly described the second of the two types of conditions precedent as
"those acts or events, which occur subsequently to the making of a contract, that must occur
before there is a right to immediate performance and before there is a breach of contractual
duty." Id (citations omitted).
38. Id
39. See Lynch v. Stebbins, 127 Me. 203, 142 A. 735 (1928) (a promise to pay something
on the happening of a certain event binds the promisor, though he is not liable to perform
while the condition is unfulfilled).
40. For example:
If one contracts to purchase a vessel at sea upon her safe arrival in port, no
one will dispute that the obligation to deliver on one side, and to pay on the
other, arises upon her safe arrival. The vessel may never arrive, and the con-
tract is not absolute to performance on either side til the contemplated contin-
gency occurs; but the contract is binding and only awaits the event, to become
binding also to performance.
3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 625 n.3 (1960) (quoting Corson v. Mulvany, 49 Pa.
88 (1865) (emphasis added)).
41. 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 40, § 644.
42. See Atlas Torpedo Co. v. United States Torpedo Co., 15 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1929, no writ). "When a contract is made subject to the approval or disap-
proval of either of the parties or a third party, it is the good faith of the party who is to be
satisfied and not the reasonableness of his dissatisfaction which constitutes the test of the
right." Id at 152. See also Giles v. Union Land Co., 196 S.W. 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Galveston 1917, writ ref'd) (vendee justified in refusing title as tendered in that he in good
faith and not capriciously declared himself dissatisfied); Fessman v. Barnes, 108 S.W. 170
(Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ) (defendant may not, arbitrarily and without reason, refuse to
1979]
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the commitment contains a condition to be fulfilled to the satisfaction of a
third party, such as an architect or an engineer, the courts are more likely
to hold that personal satisfaction must be met before performance is re-
quired.' If the condition to be satisfied involves objective tests, such as
operative fitness or mechanical utility rather than personal tastes, there can
be substantial compliance and the condition can be satisfied even though
the promisor thinks otherwise.45 The extent and quality of this perform-
ance can be measured by objective tests, scientific and mechanical in na-
ture, that are uniform in application for all persons.46
According to the above analysis, if the lender's commitment to the bor-
rower contains an offer to make a loan with specific terms setting forth the
material elements of the obligations of both parties and such offer is ac-
cepted by the borrower, a valid and binding contract exists even though
the lender may not be required to fund the loan until each of the condi-
tions precedent to that obligation has been satisfied. It is often easier to
determine that a valid contract exists than to determine whether all condi-
tions precedent to performance have been satisfied. Thus, it is likely that
the legislature intended the phrase "legally bound to make the loan" to
mean that point in time when a valid and binding contract is formed.
Interpretation of a written commitment agreement under H.B. 409 may
not frequently arise, however, because lenders typically will not issue a
written commitment for a residential mortgage. Often, the borrower will
call or visit the loan officer and ask that a loan be made on certain terms.
The loan officer will then request a copy of the contract of sale, require a
survey, an appraisal, a loan application, and then, after loan committee
approval, verbally inform the potential borrower that a loan can be made.
Such a situation raises the question of whether an oral commitment to
make a loan is legally binding on the lender. If a writing is required to
bind the lender but no written commitment is issued, then it follows that
the lender is not bound until the day the loan is closed. The Statute of
Frauds47 requires that a contract for the sale of real estate be in writing
pay under contract calling for plaintiff to dig a well to provide a water supply satisfactory to
defendant).
43. See, e.g., Fessman v. Barnes, 108 S.W. 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ). "[His
action in expression of dissatisfaction must be founded on such facts as would induce such
action on the part of a reasonable man." Id at 171.
44. 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 40, § 646.
45. Id See Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 6 S.W.2d 1031 (1928).
46. 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 40, § 646.
47. The Texas Statute of Frauds applicable to loan agreements provides:
(a) A promise or agreement described in Subsection (b) of this section is
not enforceable unless the promise or agreement, or a memorandum of it, is
(1) in writing; and
(2) signed by the person to be charged with the promise or agreement
or by someone lawfully authorized to sign for him.
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and contain an adequate property description to be enforceable.48 Simi-
larly, an oral contract to make a loan on real estate, to be secured by the
borrower's mortgage or deed of trust lien, is within the Statute of Frauds
and unenforceable for failure to be in writing.4 9
Although Texas is a "lien theory" jurisdiction,5" for purposes of the
Statute of Frauds a mortgage is deemed a conveyance of real estate as
security for the payment of a debt.5 Thus, an oral contract to grant a
mortgage comes within the Statute of Frauds,5 2 and no oral loan commit-
ment is legally binding until reduced to writing. Consequently, H.B. 409
ties the fixing of the ceiling interest rate to the date of issuing a written
commitment to a potential borrower. Depending on which direction the
market for ten-year Treasury notes and bonds is moving, lenders and bor-
rowers will have a conflict of interest in setting the date on which the
lender becomes legally bound to make a loan under H.B. 409. In a period
(b) Subsection (a) of this section applies to
(4) a contract for the sale of real estate;
(6) an agreement which is not to be performed within one year from
the date of making the agreement ....
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1978-1979).
48. In Williams v. Ellison, 493 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. 1973), the Texas Supreme Court
defined the test for a sufficient description of property:
This Court has consistently stated that the test for determining the suffi-
ciency of the description of land in contracts to convey land, for compliance
with the statute of frauds, is that "[t]o be sufficient, the writing must furnish
within itself, or by reference to some other existing writing, the means or data
by which the land to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable cer-
tainty."
Exactly what threshold of description is required is unclear. One court held a description
to be legally sufficient when it contained a street address and lot dimensions as well as the lot
and block number in the city and county in which the property was located, notwithstanding
the absence of a reference to the map or deed records. See Pockrus v. Connelly, 521 S.W.2d
115 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref d n.r.e.). In contrast, another court held that
a property description that consisted of a map not drawn to scale and not showing the width
or length of boundary lines was insufficient to meet the requirements of the Statute of
Frauds. See Guenther v. Amer-Tex Constr., 534 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976,
no writ).
49. See Edward Scharf Assoc. v. Skiba, 538 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976,
no writ). In Skiba the plaintiffs who had entered into a contract of sale for a new home
thereafter applied to the lender for a purchase money loan. The lender committed to loan
the money to the borrower; when the lender later refused to make the loan, the borrowers
lost their earnest money and sustained additional damages. The trial court awarded judg-
ment to the borrowers in their suit against the lender for specific performance and damages,
but on appeal, the court reversed and held that the oral contract, which contemplated the
creation of a lien on realty, was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Id at 503.
50. See Duffy, The Character of Mortgages of Real Estate in Texas, 12 S. TEX. L.J. 129
(1970). In a lien theory state, the mortgagee takes only a security interest in the realty. In
contrast, in states following the title theory, the mortgagee takes title to the underlying re-
alty. 1d at 129-32. In Texas, a deed of trust with a power of sale is the preferred real estate
security document because it avoids the necessity of and is faster than judicial foreclosure.
The term "mortgage" as used in this Article will refer to both mortgages and deeds of trust.
51. Poarch v.Duncan, 91 S.W. 1110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906, writ ref'd).
52. See Woodman v. Bishop, 203 S.W.2d 977 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1947, no
writ) (contract contemplating creation of a lien on land must be in writing to be binding).
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of rising interest rates, a lender may, in fact, desire to avoid becoming
legally bound until the loan is actually closed.
Legislative History. Aside from this plain meaning interpretation of "le-
gally bound," other sections of H.B. 409 and the statute's legislative history
support the interpretation outlined above. An earlier version of H.B. 409
contained a "sunset" clause:
(f) Section (d) of this Article does not apply to a loan made on or
after September 1, 1981. On a loan of the type described by Section
(d) that is made on or after that date, interest may not be charged at a
rate greater than 10% per annum. For purposes of this section, a loan
is made on the date that the note is executed.53
The final version of the "sunset" provision states that "[tihe interest rates
authorized by this subsection shall not be applicable to any loan made on
or after September 1, 1981, unless the lender had become legally bound to
make such loan prior to such date."'5 4 By this revision, the legislature obvi-
ously intended that the words "legally bound to make such loan" mean
something different from the date the loan is made. Of course, if no bind-
ing commitment is issued prior to the making of the loan, the critical date
for determining the applicable interest rate ceiling will be the date the loan
is made.
B. Could the Collection of a Prepayment Charge or Penalty Not
Required by an Agency Created by Federal Law Render a Loan
Usurious?
Section (d)(4)55 of amended article 5069-1.07 prohibits the collection of
prepayment charges and penalties on loans made pursuant to section (d)(1)
of the statute, except where such collection is "required by an agency cre-
ated by federal law."56 The most important of several questions arising
from this provision is what is the effect if a lender collects such a charge?
A borrower might argue that such a charge should be deemed interest,
thereby rendering a loan already bearing the maximum rate usurious.
Historically, Texas courts have not treated prepayment charges57 as in-
terest58 on the ground that the charges are not compensation for the use of
money but, rather, compensation for the privilege of repaying a loan
53. H.B. 409, 66th Legis., Reg. Sess. (as passed house, May 9, 1979).
54. 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 715, § I, at 1766 (Vernon).
55. No prepayment charge or penalty may be collected on any loan transaction of
the class defined in Subsection (d)(1) bearing a rate of interest in excess of that
authorized by Article 1.04, Title 79, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925,
except where such collection is required by an agency created by federal law.
1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 715, § 1, at 1766 (Vernon).
56. See note 55 supra and text accompanying note 66 infra.
57. Prepayment charges are typically computed as a given percentage of the outstand-
ing principal balance of the indebtedness.
58. See Gulf Coast Inv. Corp. v. Prichard, 438 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dal-
las), writ re/dn.r.e., 447 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1969) (prepayment penalty was not compensation
"for the use, or forebearance or detention of money").
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before maturity.59 Because they were not interest, prepayment charges
could not render a loan usurious.6 °
A disgruntled borrower forced to pay a prepayment charge not required
by an agency created by federal law, however, could point out that the
prohibition against prepayment charges is contained in a usury statute and
the absence of any other penalty in the statute indicates that the legislature
intended to treat the collection of prepayment charges as the collection of
additional interest, thereby rendering the loan usurious. Moreover, the
borrower could argue that the legislature would not have included a sepa-
rate subsection prohibiting prepayment charges unless it intended that vio-
lations of the subsection be penalized. The only statutory penalty
available would appear to be the usury penalty.61
Notwithstanding the foregoing arguments, it is doubtful that a lender
who collects a prepayment charge in violation of H.B. 409 would be sub-
ject to a usury penalty. Rather than reversing a long-established rule of
Texas case law, a court could simply require the lender to refund any such
charge, without imposing the punitive usury provisions. Furthermore,
lenders could persuasively counter the above arguments by emphasizing
that clear and unequivocal language in the statute would be required to
overturn the long-established rule that prepayment charges are not inter-
est.62 House Bill 409 merely prohibits the collection of such penalties by
certain lenders under certain circumstances. Moreover, since the usury
statute is penal in nature, lenders could argue that it should be strictly
construed and not applied beyond its plain meaning.63
Because treating prepayment penalities as interest would overturn firmly
established prior law, it is likely that the legislature intended only what it
expressly stated in the statute and no more: the collection of prepayment
penalties is prohibited on all loans with interest rates in excess of ten per-
cent unless required by agencies created by federal law. The provision's
purpose may be completely served through ordinary remedies such as an
injunctive suit to prevent collection of prepayment charges or a damages
action to recover such charges, without resort to the usury penalities.64
Interestingly, a proposed house committee amendment would have in-
59. Boyd v. Life Ins. Co., 546 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1977, writ ref'd).
60. Id
61. See note 11 supra.
62. See note 58-60 su ra and accompanying text.
63. See City of San Marcos v. Lower Colo. River Auth., 508 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1974), modf led in other respects, 523 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1975) (statutes impos-
ing penalties or forfeitures will be strictly construed in determining whether the act applies
to persons not clearly included by the language of the law); Hull v. Chapman, 464 S.W.2d
705, 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, writ dism'd) (penal statute will be strictly construed so
as not to extend it beyond its plain meaning or apply it to situations it was not intended to
remedy).
64. An important distinction should be noted between "contracting for" prepayment
charges and "collecting" prepayment charges. House Bill 409 prohibits only the latter;
hence, a lender could include such a provision in the promissory note without violating the
statute.
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sured the borrower's right to prepay a loan bearing more than ten percent
per annum under H.B. 409.65 The enacted version of the prepayment pro-
vision does not protect the borrower in this fashion because a lender could
simply fail to grant the borrower the right to prepay. Without the express
grant, the borrower has no such right.
C. What Is an Agency Created by Federal Law?
As indicated above, H.B. 409's prohibition on collection of prepayment
charges and penalties contains an exception for charges "required by an
agency created by federal law."66 What is an "agency created by federal
law" and when does such an agency require prepayment penalities? The
statute itself gives no guidance beyond the words used and there is no
helpful legislative history available. The legislature's choice of wording is
broader than it could have been, as it includes not only "federal agencies"
but also all "agencies created by federal law." For purposes of the federal
Administrative Procedure Act, an agency is defined as "each authority of
the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to another
agency."67 Government-owned or -controlled corporations have been
held to be administrative agencies when they are organized to administer
specific federal statutory provisions." Given the importance of the
secondary mortgage market and government mortgage insurance to the
residential mortgage lending industry, and the peculiar wording of the
statute, it is probable that H.B. 409's limited authorization of the collection
of prepayment charges contemplates the requirements of organizations
such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), the Govern-
ment National Mortgage Association (GNMA),69 the Federal Home Loan
65. Amend H.B. No. 409 by adding to Section 1 thereof the following:
(d)(3) The provisions of Subsection (d)(1) shall not be applicable to any
loan transaction if the loan contract provides for a rate of interest in excess of
that authorized by Article 1.04, Title 79, Revised Civil Statutes, 1925, and fails
to give the obligor the full right of prepayment without charge or penalty.
Amendment # 2, Texas Legislative Service, House Committee Amendments to H.B. 409
(May 4, 1979).
66. See note 55 supra.
67. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1976).
68. See Acron Inv., Inc. v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 363 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1966)
(Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation is an agency for purposes of 28 U.S.C.
§ 451 (1976)).
69. FNMA and GNMA collectively perform the three functions originally possessed by
the predecessor Federal National Mortgage Association, created by the National Housing
Act in 1943. Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246. These three functions are (1) managing and
liquidating the portfolio of mortgages acquired by the predecessor FNMA before 1954; (2)
performing the special assistance functions of channeling federal funds to encourage se-
lected types of mortgages, or to maintain a high level national economy; and (3) providing a
secondary market facility for home mortgages. Murray, The Developing National Mortgage
Market." Some Reflections and Projections, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 441 (1972). Title
VII of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 partitioned the predecessor FNMA
into the present FNMA and GNMA. Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476. The mortgage port-
folio managing and liquidating function and the special assistance function were delegated
to GNMA, a federally chartered corporation that was created as an agency within the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1717, 1720-1723 (1976). The
secondary market function was delegated to the present FNMA, a federally chartered but
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Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC),7° and the Federal Housing Administra-
tion (FHA).71 Viewed in this way, H.B. 409's prepayment provision ap-
pears to be an attempt to balance borrowers' need to refinance mortgage
loans if and when interest rates decline with the need of lenders to satisfy
requirements of the secondary mortgage market and mortgage insurers.
Of the foregoing organizations, only the FLHMC and FNMA currently
require the use of a prepayment penalty and then only in their approved
form of note for conventional loans.72 However, the FNMA/FHLMC
form of note for use in Texas on all conventional loans originated after
January 1, 1980 will grant the borrower the right to prepay the loan with-
out a prepayment penalty.73
III. CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF H.B. 409
House Bill 409 contains several features that may subject it to a constitu-
tional attack. The first basis for such an attack is the clause of H.B. 409
providing for an alternative to the floating rate provision in the event the
floating rate is found unconstitutional. The second basis for attack is the
antidiscrimination and antiredlining features of section 4 of H.B. 409.
A. Is It Constitutionally Permissible to Draft a Statute with
Alternative Provisions?
Section 3 of H.B. 40974 was added in the anticipation that a Texas court
privately owned corporation which purchases conventional and VA- and FHA-insured loans
from home mortgage lenders. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1717-1719, 1723 (1976). See generally 1 PRAC-
TICING LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION 9-11 (1975).
70. FHLMC is authorized to purchase loans from certain federally insured lenders such
as savings and loan associations and insured commercial banks, under section 305(a)(1) of
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act. 12 U.S.C. § 145(a)(1) (1976). See
Bums, The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association-The First 400 Days and Beyond-A
Legal View, 30 FED. B.J. 303 (1971); Murray, supra note 69, at 445-46.
71. The Federal Housing Administration Regulations, issued pursuant to § 203 of the
National Housing Act, govern the eligibility requirements for mortgages covering one- to
four-family dwellings. Section 203.22 requires that such mortgages contain a provision per-
mitting the mortgagor to prepay the mortgage in whole or in part after giving the mortgagee
30 days advance written notice of intention to prepay. Moreover, it prohibits such mort-
gages from providing for a charge on account of such prepayment. 24 C.F.R. § 203.22
(1979).
72. FNMA Conventional Home Mortgage Selling Contract Supplement, 2 FED. BANK-
ING L. REP. (CCH) 125,721.05. The FNMA/VA Mortgage Contract Supplement specifically
states that a prepayment penalty is not required in the government-insured home mortgages
it covers. Id. 25,539A.
73. FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Instrument-Texas--I to 4 Family-8/79.
74. Section 3 provides as follows:
In the event that the floating rate provisions of Section I of this Act are held to
be unconstitutional, then Article 1.07, Title 79, Revised Civil Statutes of
Texas, 1925, as amended (Article 5069-1.07, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes),
is amended by adding a new Subsection (d) in lieu thereof to read as follows:
(d)(1) On any loan or agreement to loan secured or to be secured in whole
or in part by a lien, mortgage, security interest, or other interest in or with
respect to real property on which is located one or more single family dwell-
ings, or dwelling units for not more than four families in the aggregate, inter-
est may be charged at the rate of 12 percent per annum. A "dwelling unit"
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may hold the floating interest rate provision of article 5069-1.07(d)(1) to
be unconstitutional. To protect the entire statute from invalidity, section 3
of H.B. 409 provides an alternative by restating essentially the same basic
language used in section 1 but deleting the floating interest rate provision
and, curiously, the phrase "such rates as may be permitted by other appli-
cable law."7 5 This contingency drafting was designed to take advantage of
judicial interpretations of the severability of unconstitutional portions of
statutes.
A court has the power to review legislation and invalidate any unconsti-
tutional sections of such legislation.76 When a court so acts, the validity of
the remainder of the statute is also in jeopardy. The general rule is that a
court will attempt to sustain the remaining legislation, provided it can de-
termine that the legislature would have enacted the remnant of the statute
without the offending provision and that the remaining legislation is capa-
ble of execution.77 The court's decision depends on the content of each
statute.78
shall mean for the purpose of this section a unified combination of rooms that
is designed for residential use by one family.
(2) The interest rates authorized by this subsection shall not be applicable
to any loan made on or after September 1,1981, unless the lender hadbecome
legally bound to make such loan prior to such date.
(3) No prepayment charge or penalty may be collected on any loan trans-
action of the class defined in Subsection (d)(1) bearing a rate of interest in
excess of that authorized by Article 1.04, Title 79, Revised Civil Statutes of
Texas, 1925, except where such collection is required by an agency created by
federal law.
1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 715, § 3, at 1766-67 (Vernon) (footnote omitted).
75. Id
76. See generally I C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2.01 (4th
ed. 1972).
77. See Southern Canal Co. v. State Bd. of Water Eng'rs, 311 S.W.2d 938, 942 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin), a19'd, 159 Tex. 227, 318 S.W.2d 619 (1958).
78. See City of Farmersville v. Texas-Louisiana Power Co., 55 S.W.2d 195, 204 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1932), rep'd, 67 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, judgmt adopted).
Two approaches to severability are revealed in a comparison of the intermediate and senior
appellate courts' reasoning. The court of civil appeals held:
"It is undoubtedly elementary law that the same statute may be in part consti-
tutional and in part unconstitutional, and, if the parts are wholly independent
of each other, that which is constitutional may stand, and that which is uncon-
stitutional will be rejected; but if the different parts of the act are so intimately
connected with and dependent upon each other as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into
effect the legislature would not have passed the residue independently, and
some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent
upon each other must fail."
55 S.W.2d at 204 (quoting Johnson v. State, 59 N.J.L. 535, 37 A. 949, 950 (1897)).
The Texas Commission of Appeals reversed, stating that by striking out the void section
of the statute, the statute would have a broader scope than the legislature intended. The
Commission stated the controlling rule:
"If, by striking out a void exception, proviso or other restrictive clause, the
remainder, by reason of its generality, will have a broader scope as to subject
or territory, its operation is not in accord with the legislative intent, and the
whole would be affected and made void by the invalidity of such part."
67 S.W.2d at 238 (quoting I J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 306 (J. Lewis 2d ed. 1904)).
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Legislative attempts to provide for such contingencies are not unusual.79
Statutes frequently contain provisions stating that if a part of the statute is
declared unconstitutional, then the remainder of the statute shall remain
effective."0 The courts are receptive to such language, unless they are con-
vinced that it is so routine as to be mere boilerplate and not an expression
of legislative intent that the statute be saved.81
A review of Texas law discloses no other Texas statute containing a
clause comparable to section 3,82 which, rather than merely stating that a
section shall be sustained to the extent possible, goes on to draft the section
as it would appear if the offensive language were struck down. Because
the courts have been receptive even to the more general savings clause,
however, this more self-conscious attempt by a legislature, far from being
considered invalid, should be considered to be the strongest possible evi-
dence of the legislature's will that the statute be saved.
B. May the Texas Legislature Constitutionally Distinguish Among
Lending Institutions with Respect to Antidiscrimination and
Antiredlining Requirements?
Section 4 of H.B. 409 penalizes certain types of lending institutions if
they engage in prohibited discrimination or redlining83 practices in con-
nection with residential loans.84 That section's penalty is an interest ceil-
79. See 2 C. SANDS, supra note 76, § 44.08.
80. For example, in City of Houston v. State, 171 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Galveston), rey'd, 142 Tex. 190, 176 S.W.2d 928, appeal dismissed, 322 U.S. 711 (1943), the
statute in question included a saving clause that
"should any section or part of this ordinance be held unconstitutional, illegal
or invalid, such unconstitutionality, illegality or invalidity of such section or
part shall in no wise affect, impair or invalidate the remaining portion thereof,
but as to it the same shall be and remain in full force and effect."
81. 2 C. SANDS, supra note 76, at § 44.08.
82. See note 74 supra.
83. "Redlining" describes the process used by banks and other lending institutions to
refuse systematically to grant mortgages and make home improvement loans in certain ur-
ban neighborhoods. See Note, Attacking the Urban Redlining Problem, 56 B.U.L. REV. 989,
989 (1976).
84. The full text of § 4 is as follows:
Article 1.07, Title 79, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, as amended (Arti-
cle 5069-1.07, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), is amended by adding Subsec-
tion (e) to read as follows:
(e)(l) In this subsection "financial institution" means a state bank, state
savings and loan association, mortgage banking institution, credit union, na-
tional bank, or federal savings and loan association, and "housing accomoda-
tion" means improved or unimproved real property, or a portion of that
property, that is used or occupied or is intended, arranged, or designed to be
used or occupied as the residence of one or more individuals.
(2) A financial institution may not charge interest under Subsection (d),
Section I or Subsection (d) of Section 3 of this Act and the maximum rate of
interest that it may charge is limited to 10 percent if the financial institution in
connection with such loan discriminates in providing or granting financial
assistance to purchase, rehabilitate, improve, or refinance a housing accommo-
dation due, in whole or in part, to the consideration of:
(i) conditions, characteristics, or trends in the neighborhood where the
property is located, unless the financial institution can demonstrate that such a
1979]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ing of ten percent, and it applies to the following classes of lenders: state
banks, state savings and loan associations, mortgage banking institutions,
credit unions, national banks, and federal savings and loan associations.8 5
Noticeably absent from the group are such other home mortgage lenders
as life insurance companies. Because the statute thus regulates some
classes of lenders and omits others, to be constitutionally valid the statu-
tory classification must satisfy the equal protection requirements of both
the Texas86 and the United States Constitutions.87 The statute regulates
one class of lenders by limiting its authority to charge higher rates of inter-
est, thus infringing only that class's economic interests. Unlike infringe-
ments of fundamental liberties such as freedom of speech, which are
subjected to "strict scrutiny" review, 8 a classification that does not create
a "suspect classification"8 9 and that infringes only economic interests must
satisfy only the deferential "rational relationship" standard of review,90
consideration in the particular case is required to avoid an unsafe or unsound
business practice; or
(ii) race, color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin, or ancestry; or
in appraising a housing accommodation or in determining whether or not, or
under what terms and conditions, to provide financial assistance to purchase,
rehabilitate, improve, or refinance a housing accommodation, considers:
(i) the racial, ethnic, religious, or national origin composition of the neigh-
borhood or geographic area surrounding the property; or
(ii) whether or not that composition is undergoing change, or is expected
to undergo change.
1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 715, § 4, at 1767 (Vernon) (footnote omitted).
85. Id. § (e)(1).
86. See TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 3, which provides: "All free men ... have equal rights
.Although phrased specifically in terms of "men," the Texas equal protection guar-
antee has been interpreted by Texas courts analogously to the United States Supreme
Court's interpretations of the fourteenth amendment provision, thereby including within its
protection not only men but also women and such artificial "persons" as corporations. See,
e.g., San Antonio Retail Grocers, Inc. v. Lafferty, 156 Tex. 574, 297 S.W.2d 813 (1957).
87. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
88. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (freedom of speech). See also
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (classification of habitual offenders to be sub-
jected to compulsory sterilization must satisfy strict scrutiny).
89. Suspect classifications, for purposes of equal protection analysis, are generally those
classes whose members are powerless to change their membership in the class, including
classifications based on race, illegitimacy, alien status, and poverty. For an early statement
of the suspect classification concept, see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938).
90. In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), the Court sustained a
statute that prohibited drawing mineral waters out of the ground for the purpose of distilling
out and selling separately the gas trapped in the water, although drawing water out of rock
was permitted. The test by which the Court upheld the statutory classification was as fol-
lows:
I. The equal-protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not take from
the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the
exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done
only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that
clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in
practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a
law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that
would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a
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which has been applied by courts to both the Texas and United States92
equal protection provisions. Under this relaxed standard the legislature's
classification of lenders for purposes of redlining regulation should easily
pass muster, because the Texas Constitution itself empowers the Texas
Legislature to "classify loans and lenders" for purposes of regulating inter-
est rates.9 3
C. Has the Legislature Unconstitutionally Delegated Its Authority to Set
Maximum Interest Rates?
The Texas Constitution specifically authorizes the legislature to fix max-
imum rates of interest.94 The Texas attorney general recently construed
this enumerated power, advising that "the Legislature may not delegate its
power to establish maximum interest rates" and that if the legislature "fails
to exercise its power to state the maximum by attempting to delegate it to
an administrative agency, the constitutional maximum will come into ef-
fect."' 95 Although the attorney general opinion addressed the issue of dele-
gating interest rate-setting to federal agencies actually engaged in making
loans, H.B. 409 raises the question of whether the legislature has improp-
erly delegated its power by linking the maximum rate that a lender can
charge to the market yield on specified federal obligations. The language
of the statute itself casts doubt on the constitutionality of the floating rate
provisions. The improper delegation, if any, is seen in allowing the max-
imum rate of interest that may be charged on home loans under the float-
ing rate, in effect, to be determined by the note rate97 until the floating rate
reaches twelve percent. The argument would be that until this ceiling is
reached, the maximum rate of interest is a floating rate to be determined
law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reason-
able basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
Id at 78-79.
91. Under art. I, § 3 of the Texas Constitution,
[Tihe Legislature has the power, however, to adopt any classification it sees fit,
provided there is any reasonable basis for such classification .... [It] has the
power to make any classifications and exemptions which are not arbitrary and
unreasonable .... In determining whether a classification is arbitrary and
unreasonable ... the test is whether there is any basis for the classification
which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature.
Ground Water Conservation Dist. No. 2 v. Hawley, 304 S.W.2d 764, 767-68 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1957, writ refd n.r.e.) (citations omitted).
92. See note 90 supra.
93. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11. See Wagner v. Austin Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 525 S.W.2d
724, 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ), where the court noted the special power
given only to savings and loan associations to charge premiums in making loans as an exam-
ple of a permitted "lender classification" by the legislature.
94. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11; see note 7 supra and accompanying text.
95. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. LA-146 (1977). Article XVI, § II of the Texas Constitution sets a
maximum annual rate of 10% when the legislature fails to legislate otherwise. See note 10
supra.
96. See note 24 supra.
97. As of Sept. 7, 1979, that rate was 9%, yielding a floating rate of 11%. See note 30
supra.
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according to a rate of interest on federal obligations set by a federal
agency.
The validity of the delegation of legislative authority depends on
whether the Texas Legislature has prescribed sufficient standards to guide
the discretion which is conferred. If sufficient standards are prescribed,
then the power that is conferred is not legislative and the delegation is
lawful.98
The better view is that the legislature has not delegated any authority,
legislative or otherwise, but has merely selected the note rate as an objec-
tive economic indicator to be determined from time to time independently
of maximum allowable rates of interest in Texas.99 House Bill 409 does
not in fact confer any power on the board of governors of the Federal
Reserve System to set maximum rates of interest on home loans in Texas.
Instead, the legislature has chosen the note rate as an objective standard
for determining usury, with the limitation that the maximum rate of inter-
est may not, in any event, exceed an annual rate of twelve percent.
As a general principle a Texas court determining the constitutionality of
a statute is charged with the duty of construing it so as to render it valid, if
it can be done lawfully."° This duty cannot be relied upon, however, as
assurance that the floating rate provision of H.B. 409 will be held to be
constitutional. Assuming that the floating rate provisions of H.B. 409 are
unconstitutional, it then becomes necessary to determine when the fixed
twelve percent rate would take effect.' It is unclear whether the alterna-
tive provision is intended to be effective (a) as of the date of the holding of
unconstitutionality, or (b) retroactively as of the effective date of H.B. 409.
If the twelve percent alternative does not take effect retroactively, and if a
holding of unconstitutional delegation means that the floating rate was
never effective, a lender who collected eleven percent interest in reliance
on the floating rate provision may be guilty of usury and be subject to the
appropriate usury penalty.
98. See Housing Auth. v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 172, 143 S.W.2d 79, 87 (1940),
in which the court stated that "[in the delegation of legislative authority the legislature must
set up standards. . . . Such standards may be broad where conditions must be considered
which cannot be conveniently investigated by the legislature." See also Moody v. City of
Univ. Park, 278 S.W.2d 912, 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ refd n.r.e.), in which
the court stated:
"It is fundamental that a legislative body may not delegate unlimited legisla-
tive powers and functions to an administrative agency. Whenever the legisla-
tive body vests any administrative agency, such as a zoning board, with the
power to exercise discretion, it must spell out the limits of that discretion by
the establishment of some standard to guide the agency. Such a standard may
be general and at the same time be valid if it is capable of reasonable applica-
tion."
(quoting 1 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 327 (3d ed. 1953)).
99. Distinguish this independent, unrelated federal action from the issue raised in TEX.
ATT'Y GEN. LA- 146 (1977): whether exempting VA and FHA loans from Texas usury laws
is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority because the respective federal agen-
cies involved set the usury threshold. See note 95 supra.
100. See notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text.
101. See notes 74-82 supra and accompanying text.
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A law that is found unconstitutional is generally held to be void from its
inception, and no acts performed under it are justified.'" 2 On equitable
principles, however, those who act in good-faith reliance on a statute
should not be held accountable for acts committed before that statute is
held unconstitutional.0 3 Whether these equitable principles would protect
a lender who makes home mortgage loans at more than ten percent inter-
est in reliance on H.B. 409 is questionable.
IV. REDLINING AND DISCRIMINATION PENALTIES OF H.B. 409
A. When Does a Financial Institution Discriminate Based Upon
Prohibited Class!fications?
The most troublesome portions of H.B. 409 are found in section 4. That
section of the bill adds section (e)(2) to article 5069-1.07 and delineates
various acts of discrimination in the financing of "housing accommoda-
tions" as defined in the statute."° This section suffers from both poor
wording and confusing organization. Unfortunately, it attempts to rectify
a social problem by limiting rates of interest that certain lenders can
charge, but it fails to prohibit discriminatory behavior directly. Moreover,
it provides no remedy to a person who fails to obtain a loan because of the
delineated discriminatory behavior.
Section (e)(2) of article 5069-1.07 prohibits a financial institution from
charging the new maximum interest rates if such lender, in granting
financial assistance to purchase, rehabilitate, improve, or refinance a hous-
ing accommodation, commits any of three prohibited practices. A lender
is to be penalized if it (1) discriminates against persons on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin, or ancestry; (2) discrimi-
nates against property located in neighborhoods with certain characteris-
tics; or (3) considers the sociological composition of the neighborhood or
the degree to which it is changing or likely to change while appraising a
house or determining on what terms and conditions the lender might loan
money.10 5 The scope of this section is disturbingly unclear.
Lenders may take some comfort in the legislature's use of the ambiguous
phrasing "in connection with such loan," which may serve as a limitation
102. See Miller v. Davis, 136 Tex. 299, 150 S.W.2d 973 (1941) (unconstitutional statute
purporting to create a nonprofit corporation held not even sufficient to create a de facto
corporation); cf. Sharber v. Florence, 131 Tex. 341, 115 S.W.2d 604 (1938) (original rights
obtained under a judgment will be protected in spite of a void statute, but rights acquired
under such void statute will not be similarly protected).
103. See Wichita County v. Robinson, 155 Tex. 1, 276 S.W.2d 509 (1954) (tax assessor-
collector not required to repay compensation he received under an unconstitutional statute).
104. See note 84 supra. For general discussions of other state and federal attempts to
curb redlining, see Givens, The "'ntiredlining" Issue. Can Banks Be Forced to Lend?, 95
BANKING L.J. 515 (1978); Van Alstyne, Redlining--The Cure Worse than the Illness, 3 J.
CONTEMP. L. 264 (1977); Note, supra note 83; Note, Redlinin--The Fight/Against Discrimi-
nation in Mortgage Lending, 6 Loy. CHI. L.J. 71 (1975); Note, The Home Mortgage Disclo-
sure Act of 1975: Will It Protect Urban Consumers From Redlinings?, 12 NEw ENG. L. REV.
957 (1977).
105. See note 84 supra.
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on the scope of the section. If "in connection with such loan" refers to a
particular loan in connection with which the lender discriminated, the pen-
alty would appear to apply only to those improper loans. This narrow
construction gains some support from the language of section 4 as a whole.
"Such loan" is singular, and section (e)(2) of amended article 5069-1.07
refers to "a [singular] housing accommodation." In addition, the unsound
business exception of section (e)(2)(i) uses the phrase "in the particular
case."' 1 6 One possible construction of section (e)(2) might be: The maxi-
mum rate of interest that a lender may charge on a particular loan is lim-
ited to ten percent if it commits one of the discriminatory acts. Although
this construction is narrow, it is reasonable, because any broader construc-
tion would provide no additional benefit to the victims of redlining in the
making of the particular loan, although it would admittedly make redlin-
ing more onerous for the lender. Because of the ambiguous wording, how-
ever, the ten percent limit could be applied not only to loans in which the
lender discriminated, but to all loans made by the lender. As a practical
matter, the first construction is unlikely because it is doubtful that one who
receives a loan to the exclusion of another, or at a lower interest rate, could
successfully sue to reduce his loan to ten percent on the ground that he was
the beneficiary of illegal discrimination against another. Additionally, the
ten percent limitation, being a de facto penalty, should be strictly con-
strued by the courts.'0 7
Furthermore, the phrase "in connection with such loan" may serve to
narrow the range of persons with standing to sue for a violation of this
section. This nexus requirement would seem to bar suits by third parties
seeking to vindicate a purported right held by citizens in general to reside
in a community with a vibrant central city or to live in a nondiscrimina-
tory society.' 08 Under the narrower construction only those who have
been discriminated against would have standing to sue. Of course, for a
borrower who has been wrongfully denied a loan, rather than given one on
less favorable terms, the statute's reduction of the interest to ten percent is
a meaningless remedy.
Thus, section (e)(2) may be narrow both in scope and remedy. The or-
ganization of section (e)(2), however, makes it unclear just how narrow it
is. A prior house version of H.B. 409 supports the narrower interpretation.
The earlier version specifically applied the phrase "in connection with
such loan" to both the first and second portions of section (e)(2). In con-
struing H.B. 409, a court might treat the earlier house version as evidence
of the legislature's intent at the time of passage of H.B. 409.19
106. Id
107. See note 63 supra.
108. Compare Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 99 S. Ct. 1601, 60 L. Ed. 2d 66
(1979) (residents of village had standing to contest "racial steering" under 42 U.S.C. § 3604
(1976) with Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (residents of neighboring towns denied
standing to challenge restrictive zoning statute). See generally Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (construing standing under Securities Exchange Act
§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976)).
109. See H.B. 409, 66th Legis., Reg. Sess. (as passed house, May 9, 1979).
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As discussed above, section (e)(2) is rather peculiarly organized. The
first part of section (e)(2) prohibits discrimination "in providing or grant-
ing financial assistance. . . due. . to the consideration of' certain char-
acteristics of either the borrower or the residential property." 0 The second
part of section (e)(2) calls for the same sanction if the lender considers the
sociological composition of the neighborhood or the extent to which it will
change in appraising a housing accommodation, determining whether or
not to provide financial assistance in connection therewith, or deciding on
what terms and conditions to make such a loan. These two parts of section
(e)(2) appear to overlap. All the preliminary procedures enumerated in the
second part of section (e)(2) seem to be necessarily subsumed under the
first part. An appraisal, a decision to grant assistance, and a decision on
terms and conditions of that assistance are all steps toward "providing or
granting financial assistance." The legislature's separate treatment of the
steps involved in a lender's credit analysis and of the final decision to grant
the loan, plus the construction of the phrase "in connection with such
loan," may be important. If, however, the phrase "in connection with such
loan" applies only to the first part, and the nexus requirement is not ap-
plied to the prohibited preliminary procedures of the second portion, a
financial institution may be successfully sued by a borrower who may not
have been individually victimized by redlining.
B. "hat is the Meaning of "Considers" as Used in H B. 409?
An example of the vagueness of section (e)(2) appears in the first portion
of that section, which prohibits discrimination "due, in whole or in part, to
the consideration of' certain personal and neighborhood characteristics." "
Similarly, the second portion of section (e)(2) imposes a penalty if the
lender "considers" the sociological composition of the area where the
mortgaged property is located." 2 It is unclear exactly what evaluative
process, whether objectively determinable or not, is contemplated to be
included in "consideration."
A broad definition of the word "consider" by the courts would create
uncertainty throughout the lending industry. As a routine business prac-
tice, financial institutions gather and use information about the social and
economic composition of the areas in which they do business. The various
social and economic data that are prohibited considerations in section
(e)(2) inescapably enter a lender's decision-making process. Thus, the
existence of a violation of section (e)(2) will depend on the meaning given
to the term "consider" by the Texas courts; that is, whether mere aware-
ness or knowledge of the prohibited factor by the lender is sufficient, or
whether some weight must have been given to it in making the loan deci-
sion. The term "consider" is not defined in the statute, but an early Dallas
court of civil appeals decision defined the term "considered" in a review of
110. See note 84 supra.
111. (Emphasis added); see note 84 supra.
112. See note 84 supra.
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the influence of improperly admitted evidence upon a trial judge sitting as
fact-finder. The court stated: "[T]he word 'considered' has reference to
and means, when used in connection with the admission of incompetent
evidence, the consideration of same by which effect is given thereto in arriv-
ing at the conclusion reached in the trial of a cause."'" 3 If this definition is
applied to the analogous lending decision, a lender will have violated sec-
tion (e)(2) when it gives some weight to one of the prohibited factors in
making the loan decision.'' 4
C. Is Section 4 of HB. 409 Unconstitutionally Vague?
Uncertainty as to the definition of the word "considers" may pose seri-
ous problems for the validity of the statute. First, the ambiguity of the
term "consider" may render the statute unconstitutionally vague.' 15 The
United States Supreme Court has subjected statutes to two major tests for
vagueness, and H.B. 409 may fail under either. Under the notice theory,
the question posed is whether a person of ordinary intelligence can deter-
mine from a reading of the statute that his conduct is prohibited." 16 It is
arguable that lenders will be unable to make such a determination under
the statute as written. The second test focuses not on notice to the defend-
ant but rather on whether the statute possesses "an ascertainable standard
of guilt" for the court and jury to apply." 7 A similar doubt exists here.
An appellate court might find these vagueness arguments compelling.
A second distinct problem with the ambiguity of "consider" concerns
the imposition of penal sanctions. Generally, penal sanctions will not be
imposed unless causation is proved. If H.B. 409 requires this element of
proof, the borrower will have to prove that his personal or neighborhood
characteristics were a factor in the lender's decision. Moreover, this bur-
den of proof is heavier than a mere showing that the lender had knowledge
or awareness of the prohibited factor.
113. Taylor v. Gossett, 269 S.W. 230, 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1925, writ dism'd)
(emphasis added).
114. Cf. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-2.07 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) (prohibit-
ing the denial of certain consumer and other regulated loans "so/ely on the basis of sex"
(emphasis added)).
115. Vagueness in a statute may render it invalid under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, on the grounds that such uncer-
tainty provides insufficient notice to the persons who may be charged with a violation, or
that it is insufficient to guide judges and juries in assessing culpability. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. See generally Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.
PA. L. REv. 67 (1960). The void-for-vagueness doctrine has been applied chiefly to invali-
date criminal statutes (see Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)) and
statutes infringing first amendment rights. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-
37 (1963). Because the Texas usury statute is penal in nature, it is analogous to a criminal
statute; hence, the void-for-vagueness analysis is applicable.
116. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (a criminal statute so
vague that men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning lacks the first essential of
due process of law).
117. See United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (Food Control
Act of 1917 set up no ascertainable standard of guilt and is thus repugnant to constitutional
requirements under the fifth and sixth amendments).
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The foregoing analysis may be tested in several hypothetical situations.
For purposes of discussion, suppose that A is a financial institution as de-
fined in H.B. 409, B a potential borrower purchasing a home in a prestigi-
ous area, and C a potential borrower purchasing a home in a blighted
neighborhood. The first, most troublesome situation is one in which C's
application for a loan is discriminatorily rejected. Even if C can prove
discrimination, section (e)(2) provides no remedy to C. The crucial phrase
is "in connection with such loan." As there is no loan, there can be no
penalty under section (e)(2). Consequently, H.B. 409 may not have the
impact intended by its drafters.
A second possible situation arises when .4 gives C a loan at twelve per-
cent interest and gives B a loan at eleven percent interest. Assume that C
and B are sociologically and economically equivalent except for the
neighborhood where they intend to reside. C could probably prove that
his higher interest rate was a result of discriminatory redlining of his
neighborhood by A.
Interest rates constitute terms or conditions of the loan agreement, and
as such, are governed by the second part of section (e)(2), 8 which re-
quires proof that the borrower was discriminated against, not on the basis
of a personal characteristic such as race but because of the sociological
composition of his neighborhood. Assuming C can offer the necessary
proof, section (e)(2) provides a remedy: the loan from A to C would be
held usurious. Thus, the rule of section (e)(2) is that if a lender chooses to
discriminate, it is prohibited from charging the new maximum rate of in-
terest; rather, a ten percent annual interest rate is the ceiling for such dis-
criminatory loans.
A third interesting situation would be a suit by C as class representative
of all residents in the blighted neighborhood who had been charged dis-
proportionately higher interest rates by A. If C can prove discrimination
against the class because of the sociological composition of the neighbor-
hood, the remedy under section (e)(2) could be a declaration that each
loan charging a rate in excess of ten percent is usurious.
Two less likely fact situations involve suits brought by B. In one, B is
charged eleven percent annually while C is charged eleven and one-half
percent annually. B could claim that section (e)(2) does not limit itself to
situations of unfavorable discrimination but proscribes all discrimination.
Thus, if B is able to show that he received favorable treatment based on
one of the designated factors, there would be "discrimination in connec-
tion with" that loan. As a result, the lender would be limited to ten percent
interest annually, and both B's and Cs loans would be usurious. 1 9
A final fact situation involves a suit by B on behalf of C and all borrow-
ers similarly situated. B does not allege discrimination in favor of himself,
but rather unfavorable discrimination against C and the members of his
118. See note 84 supra.
119. See text accompanying notes 121-29 infra.
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class. If B can withstand a challenge to his standing, 20 he may argue that
section (e)(2) prohibits A from charging more than ten percent annually on
all loans because it discriminated against a class of borrowers by consider-
ing one or more of the factors enumerated in section (e)(2).
D. Is a Loan Rendered Usurious if a Court Finds that a Lender "o
Charged More than Ten Percent Under H B. 409 Engaged in
the Proscribed Redlining or Discriminatory
Behavior?
Generally speaking, the question of usury is determined at the inception
of the contract.' 2' Therefore, if a loan contract providing for interest ex-
ceeding ten percent is found to be discriminatory under H.B. 409, that loan
will be deemed usurious from the time it was made.
Section (e)(2) of amended article 5069-1.07 uses the phrase "that it
may charge," rather than "that it may charge following a holding of dis-
crimination." Accordingly, the lender is on notice that the legal ceiling for
interest rates on its loans is ten percent if the lender is later determined to
have violated section (e)(2), at least with respect to the particular loan.
Subjecting lenders to the threat of a usury penalty is obviously intended to
be a deterrent to redlining and discriminatory lending practices.
A lender confronted by a usury suit might argue that the ten percent
ceiling should not relate back to the inception of the loan, because such a
relation back would be either a retroactive law, prohibited by the Texas
Constitution, 22 or an improper retrospective application of a statutory
provision in the absence of clear legislative intent that it meant such a
result.' 23 Such arguments, however, lack support in the Texas case law
involving retroactive claims; the only successful claims based on retroac-
120. B could argue that he is an "aggrieved party" because he has been deprived of the
right to enjoy a well-developed central city. Such an argument, however, would probably
fail. See note 108 supra and accompanying text. See generally Gladstone, Realtors v. Vil-
lage of Bellwood, 99 S. Ct. 1601, 60 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1979); Note, Standing to Sue Under Section
812 of the Fair Housing Act." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, infra p. 917.
121. Pinemont Bank v. DuCroz, 528 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, writ refd. n.r.e.).
122. "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or any law impairing the
obligation of contracts, shall be made." TEx. CONST. art. I, § 16. The retroactivity argu-
ment could be made only if the lender's loan contract at the higher rate constitutes a vested
right. Unless vested rights are destroyed or impaired, a retroactive law will not be held
invalid. City of Fort Worth v. Morrow, 284 S.W. 275, 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1926, writ ref'd). Exactly what constitutes a vested right is uncertain, but it is clear that art.
I, § 16 of the Texas Constitution protects more than just property rights. See Mellinger v.
City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 3 S.W. 249 (1887).
123. Miller & Miller Motor Freight Lines v. Gilliland, 232 S.W.2d 886, 889 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1950, writ dism'd); see Purser v. Pool, 145 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1940, no writ) (statute should have a prospective operation unless legislative intent
is clear that it should operate retrospectively). See also Hutchings v. Slemons, 141 Tex. 448,
174 S.W.2d 487 (1943) (real estate dealers license act should not operate retrospectively to
preclude suit on an oral contract for commissions); Lee v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 420
S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (amendment to
insurance code making policy incontestable after two years should not be applied to a policy
issued prior to amendment).
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tivity challenged application of a statute not in effect when the prohibited
event occurred.' 24 In the instant case, however, the statute would be effec-
tive prior to the prohibited behavior. The facts existing at the time the
loan is made will thus determine which rate is applicable to a given loan,
even though those facts may not be determined until after the loan is
made. Given the vagueness of the statutory language, the effect may be to
create uncertainty in the financial community. Financial institutions en-
gaging in activities that may be interpreted as redlining or discrimination
must take the risk that their loans may be governed by the ten percent
limit. The ultimate effect, probably consistent with the legislative intent,
will be to deter financial institutions from loan practices even remotely
approximating redlining or discriminatory behavior. A cautious approach
by lenders is warranted in light of the uncertain application of section
(e)(2). Financial institutions would be well advised to regard the provision
as validly limiting the entire loan to ten percent if the lender engages in the
proscribed behavior. Each loan file should be carefully maintained to
show an absence of discriminatory intent.
If the maximum rate of interest that a lender can charge is indeterminate
at the time the loan is made, that fact might provide a defense to usury by
allowing the lender to argue the absence of usurious intent.' 25 Neverthe-
less, this argument is unlikely to prevail in the face of the general rule that
the intent required for usury is merely the intent to make the bargain
made. 26 If the interest charged exceeds the legal maximum and the requi-
site intent is present, the lender is subject to an article 5069-1.06 pen-
alty.'
27
It is unlikely that a lender could avoid this result by inserting a "savings
provision"128 in the loan contract, because a savings clause is not effective
124. See, e.g., Cain v. State, 105 Tex. Crim. 204, 287 S.W. 262 (1926).
125. In American Century Mortgage Investors v. Regional Center, Ltd., 529 S.W.2d 578,
584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the borrower attempted to assert a usury
claim after he had used a subterfuge to obtain the loan at the higher corporate rate, but the
court held that there was no usurious intent by the lender in the absence of actual knowledge
of the subterfuge. The court stated the relevant test:
Unless the loan papers show on their face an intention to charge interest at a
greater rate than permitted by law, the burden is on the party pleading usury
to show the existence of some agreement, device, or subterfuge to charge usury
and that both parties had that purpose in contemplation.
Id at 583 (citations omitted).
126. See Miller v. First State Bank, 551 S.W.2d 89, 98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1977), afdas modled, 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978). The Fort Worth appeals court labeled
this a well-settled rule, citing, in part, Moore v. Sabine Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d 209 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Miller v. First State Bank, 551 S.W.2d at 98. In
Moore the creditor had charged an excessive time-price differential, and the Austin court
rejected the so-called "accidental or bona fide error defense," stating that a creditor may not
excuse its violation of a statute by a showing that it did not intend to violate the act. Moore
v. Sabine Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d at 213. See also Townsend v. Adler, 510 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ) (ignorance of usury laws no defense when
lender admitted intending to receive more than double the legal rate).
127. See note II supra.
128. See Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977), involving a promis-
sory note that contained a typical "savings provision":
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when a loan contract is usurious on its face. 129 A savings clause would
affirm the lender's intention to comply with the applicable usury ceiling
and possibly contain language allowing the lender to spread the excess
interest over the life of the loan so that the total interest collected would
average ten percent annually.
V. CONCLUSION
The legislature responded to the Texas mortgage money crisis by enact-
ing H.B. 409. The passage of this bill will probably increase the availabil-
ity of mortgage money in Texas, but as of the writing of this Article it is
not certain that this will be the result. Texas lenders will still be competing
with lenders in states with higher usury limits to sell their loans in the
secondary mortgage market.
As the preceding discussion indicates, H.B. 409 may create more
problems that it solves. It remains to be seen how the various questions
raised in this Article will be resolved. It is hoped that this Article will
provide some guidance to real estate practitioners in analyzing the applica-
tion and effect of H.B. 409.
"In no event shall Grantor be required to pay, for the use, forbearance or
detention of the money evidenced by the note secured hereby, more than the
maximum legal rate of interest allowed by the laws of Texas, and the right to
demand any such excess shall be and is hereby waived; any payment of an
amount in excess of the legal rate shall be considered a mistake with the excess
being applied to the principal of the note secured hereby; and this provision
shalfcontrol every other provision of the note and deed of trust."
Id at 780 (quoting from the deed of trust). The Tanner court held that advance quarterly
payments of interest could be "spread" over the subsequent years of the note so that the total
interest would be less than ten percent and thus nonusurious. Id at 786-87.
Article 5069-1.07a of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes specifically authorizes "spread-
ing":
(a) On any loan or agreement to loan secured or to be secured, in whole or
in part, by a lien, mortgage, security interest, or other interest in or with re-
spect to any interest in real property, determination of the rate of interest for
the purpose of determining whether the loan is usurious under all applicable
Texas laws shall be made by amortizing, prorating, allocating, and spreading,
in equal parts during the period of the full stated term of the loan, all interest
at any time contracted for, charged, or received from the borrower in connec-
tion with the loan.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979). The court in
Tanner, however, specifically stated that the case was decided without regard to art. 5069-
1.07(a). 561 S.W.2d at 786.
129. See Terry v. Teachworth, 431 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (disclaimer of intent to charge usurious interest cannot save a transac-





An Act relating to the rate of interest on loans secured by certain residential property.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Texas:
Section 1. Article 1.07, Title 79, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925,
as amended (Article 5069-1.07, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), is
amended by adding Subsection (d) reading as follows:
(d)(1) On any loan or agreement to loan secured or to be secured in
whole or in part by a lien, mortgage, security interest, or other interest in
or with respect to real property on which is located one or more single
family dwellings, or dwelling units for not more than four families in the
aggregate, interest may be charged at such rates as may be permitted by
other applicable law or at the lesser of the following rates:
(i) 12 percent per annum; or
(ii) a rate equivalent to the average per annum market yield rate ad-
justed to constant maturities on 10-year United States Treasury notes and
bonds as published by the board of governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem for the second calendar month preceding the month in which the
lender becomes legally bound to make the loan plus an additional two
percent per annum rounded off to the nearest quarter of one percent per
annum.
A "dwelling unit" shall mean for the purpose of this section a unified
combination of rooms that is designed for residential use by one family.
(2) Before the 20th day of each month, the savings and loan commis-
sioner shall ascertain the average per annum market yield rate adjusted to
constant maturities on 10-year United States Treasury notes and bonds for
the preceding calendar month and cause such rate to be published in the
Texas Register.
(3) The interest rates authorized by this subsection shall not be appli-
cable to any loan made on or after September 1, 1981, unless the lender
had become legally bound to make such loan prior to such date.
(4) No prepayment charge or penalty may be collected on any loan
transaction of the class defined in Subsection (d)(1) bearing a rate of inter-
est in excess of that authorized by Article 1.04, Title 79, Revised Civil Stat-
utes of Texas, 1925, except where such collection is required by an agency
created by federal law.
Sec. 2. The savings and loan section of the finance commission and the
savings and loan commissioner are hereby directed to exercise the rule-
making powers delegated to them by law and promulgate specific rules
and regulations with respect to the procedure to be followed in making
variable interest rate real estate loans by savings and loan associations sub-




Sec. 3. In the event that the floating rate provisions of Section 1 of this
Act are held to be unconstitutional, then Article 1.07, Title 79, Revised
Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, as amended (Article 5069-1.07, Vernon's
Texas Civil Statutes), is amended by adding a new Subsection (d) in lieu
thereof to read as follows:
(d)(1) On any loan or agreement to loan secured or to be secured in
whole or in part by a lien, mortgage, security interest, or other interest in
or with respect to real property on which is located one or more single
family dwellings, or dwelling units for not more than four families in the
aggregate, interest may be charged at the rate of 12 percent per annum. A
"dwelling unit" shall mean for the purpose of this section a unified combi-
nation of rooms that is designed for residential use by one family.
(2) The interest rates authorized by this subsection shall not be appli-
cable to any loan made on or after September 1, 1981, unless the lender
had become legally bound to make such loan prior to such date.
(3) No prepayment charge or penalty may be collected on any loan
transaction of the class defined in Subsection (d)(1) bearing a rate of inter-
est in excess of that authorized by Article 1.04, Title 79, Revised Civil Stat-
utes of Texas, 1925, except where such collection is required by an agency
created by federal law.
Sec. 4. Article 1.07, Title 79, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, as
amended (Article 5069-1.07, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), is amended
by adding Subsection (e) to read as follows:
(e)(1) In this subection "financial institution" means a state bank, state
savings and loan association, mortgage banking institution, credit union,
national bank, or federal savings and loan association, and "housing ac-
commodation" means improved or unimproved real property, or a portion
of that property, that is used or occupied or is intended, arranged, or
designed to be used or occupied as the residence of one or more individu-
als.
(2) A financial institution may not charge interest under Subsection
(d), Section 1 or Subsection (d) of Section 3 of this Act and the maximum
rate of interest that it may charge is limited to 10 percent if the financial
institution in connection with such loan discriminates in providing or
granting financial assistance to purchase, rehabilitate, improve, or refi-
nance a housing accommodation due, in whole or in part, to the considera-
tion of:
(i) conditions, characteristics, or trends in the neighborhood where the
property is located, unless the financial institution can demonstrate that
such a consideration in the particular case is required to avoid an unsafe or
unsound business practice; or
(ii) race, color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin, or ancestry;
or
in appraising a housing accommodation or in determining whether or not,
or under what terms and conditions, to provide financial assistance to
[Vol. 33
HO USE BILL 409
purchase, rehabilitate, improve, or refinance a housing accommodation,
considers:
(i) the racial, ethnic, religious, or national origin composition of the
neighborhood or geographic area surrounding the property; or
(ii) whether or not that composition is undergoing change, or is ex-
pected to undergo change.
Sec. 5. If any provision of this Act or any rate of interest fixed hereby
is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other provision of this
Act which can be given effect without the invalid provision and the legisla-
ture hereby declares it would have passed such valid provisions despite
such invalidity.
Sec. 6. The importance of this legislation and the crowded condition of
the calendars in both houses create an emergency and an imperative public
necessity that the constitutional rule requiring bills to be read on three
several days in each house be suspended, and this rule is hereby sus-
pended, and this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its
passage, and it is so enacted.
Passed by the House on May 9, 1979: Yeas 79, Nays 48, 16 present, not
voting; House concurred in Senate amendments to H.B. No. 409 on
May 22, 1979; Yeas 92, Nays 41, 11 present, not voting; passed by the
Senate, with amendments, on May 16, 1979: Yeas 21, Nays 10.
Approved June 13, 1979.
Effective Aug. 27, 1979, 90 days after date of adjournment.
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